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Descartes' brilliance in driving out doubt, and proving the existence of himself as a thinking entity, is well documented. Sartre's critique (or maybe extension) is both apposite and grounded and takes these enquiries on to another level.   Let's take a look. 'I think' somehow, for all its power, lacks something. What? Consider what one does when thinking (difficult, but we can try). Implicit in the word 'think', in fact the very essence of the word 'think', is that activity is going on, and if such activity is going on then it must be going on about something, an object, an emotion, a problem, or maybe some dreamlike state, but common to all these is that something is going on. 
 Is that really so? Well, if that wasn't so we would be able to think in a pure state, wouldn't we? But what does a pure state of 'thinking' mean? It can't mean that there is nothing there, because if there were nothing there then no thinking would be taking place. Can it mean that we are thinking of nothing? Well no, because if  we are thinking of nothing then we are thinking of something, we are contemplating the notion, or the nature, of nothing. In fact, one can argue that if we talk of something, in this case nothing or nothingness, then in our head we have some notion of what that is, i.e. something exists in the mind for it to come out of our mouths. Thinking is a recognition of something outside the individual, for the very act of direction, which is an indispensable part of thinking, recognises, must recognise, that there are things to address outside the individual.
  Something else to bear in mind. According to Sartre human beings are condemned to freedom. Why condemned? Human beings did not choose to be born, but the act of being born also imparts the freedom of which Sartre speaks. Freedom is something which we parrot off as being a sine qua non for the human condition. I believe that's true, but freedom in this sense isn't without its consequences for the individual human being, for individual human beings handle freedom differently. To some it enables them to fly, to others it imparts immense pressures, anguish, heartbreak, unhappiness can all be associated with such freedom. Each individual is responsible for his destiny, for his direction. If someone says that God impelled him, that individual chose his or her God, and chose to obey his or her God. This believer  has to sift through the multitude of things that his or her God desire of him or her. All this is fine, so long as we acknowledge what is going on here. Belief in God is, by definition, a belief. Belief, following Wittgenstein, is a language game with its rules and its boundaries. The essential feature of religion as language game are its boundaries, which can be summed up in the word belief. OK, belief has its practises which are its constituent parts, but belief is the boundary between religion and other language games, as the proof constituents are different.
 Our world is determined by the language used to describe everything that goes on within it. The boundaries of our world are set by the language we use. This might be better put as language gives access to ever expending boundaries. Ever expanding boundaries are only possible by ever expanding thought, and ever expanding thought is only possible by ever  expanding directions to our thought brought about through language. It is a fact taken that to be conscious is to think. How could this be otherwise? Consciousness without thought just does not make sense. Imagine a state of consciousness without directional thought. What would it be like?  It would be something never experienced, completely out of our understanding. Why? Because understanding itself is a directional thought process. If we say we are going outside our understanding then that is a world of void, and a world of void does not exist. 
Can such a world be contemplated in our thinking? Well, yes, but then it requires thinking, and thinking requires direction, and such direction requires language.  Why does direction require language? Because there is no other way for human beings to articulate a directional thought. Could one point at an image without language? Well, one could have an image in mind, but the essence of saying something about it, of descriptive power, brings  us back to the essence, to the power of language to direct.   So what of this language of which we speak? Wittgenstein's private
language argument points us towards the notion that language itself constantly develops and redevelops through human interaction. Descarte's cogito implies that thinking rules out doubt of one's own existence. But such thinking, to be valid, to make sense, to direct, must develop in a language that has developed, has been verified, by a plurality, by a plurality whose essence is social. Correct use of language symbols, i.e. words, requires that we verify and reverify the accuracy of such symbols. How do we do that? We do that in constant usage, in constant interaction, with other human beings. An individual using a private language could not be understood by others, his symbol system has not been verified by others, his meanings may not be your meanings.
 It follows from what we have said above that language is constructed, and is continually constructed, in a social context. Given our previous thoughts regarding verification this could not be otherwise. Language has a normative form. All language users are required, by their very use of the language, to verify the use of terms, grammar etc etc. As Wittgenstein cites (appropriately) games as a model, let us take a look. If I play e.g. Ludo, I am governed by the rules. It is not just that I may play dishonestly, for if I were to play at all that very dishonesty, to count as ludo, would have to be rule governed. The rules of Ludo are Ludo, they are the essence and the constitution of it. Wittgenstein, particularly in his later writings, interweaves many concepts, and connects them in different and sometimes rather elusive ways. Wittgenstein sees concepts like emotions, sentiments and experiences in these interweaving maps. Of course these can be regarded as psychological concepts   ** 

 Language can be considered in another but related way, as embodying the elements of a cultural heritage. Language was seen as embodying the notion of higher culture in the arts, architecture etc. Over recent decades this has tended to shift to consider less tangible benefits, such things as oral traditions, cultural values and cultural identity. So language enables us to explore, through the achievements of past generations, cultural mores that may have laid unchallenged for many years. Many of these values and mores may be seen as independent of the language by which they are transmitted, but still this monumental accomplishment of mankind i.e. language,enables man to explore, to modify, to codify, to extend the boundaries of human experience.
 There are therefore massive implications for our Note on Cogeto of Wittgenstein's work. Following Wittgenstein emotions and other psychological concepts can be termed depth grammar, and are distinguished by the fact that the third person of the present is recognised by observation, the  first person is not. Taking Wittgenstein's well known pain example the sentence 'He is in pain' is a third person statement of an observational nature. The sentence 'I am in pain' is not derived from observation but from experience, it is an expression of that experience, it's essence is the experience.
 The asymmetry consists in the fact that predicting psychological attributes of others is warranted by what they do and say. By contrast, the use of such statements in the first person present tense does not rest on one's observation of one's own behaviour. (Hacker 2010:287)  p 9  According to Wittgenstein 'I am in pain' is more like a cry of pain, an expression of pain, than a report of some pain. Of course this appertains for other similar statements. 'I feel good' etc.     
   Just consider these two statements. 'I know that I feel good' and 'I know that he feels good'. Now I can doubt that he feels good, he may be telling lies, but I cannot doubt that I feel good. Other people may doubt whether I feel good or not, but it is nonsensical for me to doubt it if I made the statement, hence it is not an epistemic statement, which puts it in a completely different category from second statement. It is an epistemic statement because there is room for doubt  in 'I know that he feels good', whereas there is no room for doubt in 'I know that I feel good'. Taking it a little further, and looking at the statement 'I know that I feel good', one would strongly suggest that anyone using such a statement wasn't into grammatical use as we understand it, it cannot have a none grammatical meaning by virtue of our previous arguments. The only thing we can say about 'I know that I feel good' is that, in the world of grammar it means 'I feel good', for I feel good is not based on external criteria but on the fact that it expresses, it is the essence of, it is in fact, feeling good.  We can use the same reasoning as above when we talk of direction in thinking. 'I favour that direction' is not necessarily based on external criteria, and in many situations will be based on emotion, or emotion intertwined with other workings of the mind. One does not say 'I think I favour that direction, or I think I favour that emotional stance', one favours that direction, or one takes a particular emotional stance. One is drawn in  particular directions, and they are there, already sitting in the mind, a sort of predisposition. 
 Consciousness is therefore intentional. 'I think' has intention, it cannot be otherwise, to say it has a predisposition of intention. From what has been outlined previously other aspects of human consciousness are interwoven into that intent. Emotion, feelings etc are present as part of consciousness. The mind and the body are so interwoven as to be inseparable. Any move to separate out e.g. emotion from 'thinking' is neither tenable nor desirable.
 Following Sartre we must mention beings for themselves. Beings for themselves have consciousness, and such consciousness, as we have seen, leads to direction which is the essence of thinking. But when directions cannot be achieved, or when a direction has been achieved, the goal fulfilled, there is a sort of emptiness. Such emptiness craves to be filled. Failure to fill the space of emptiness leads, according to Sartre, to feelings of anguish. Consciousness apprehends the world, using this apprehension in attempts to minimise the anguish of emptyness. 
  Here Sartre's views contrast strogly with Wittgenstein, whose ordinary language philosophy (Wittgenstein probably wouldn't have accepted this characterisation, it was largely down to his followers) is concerned with the cross fertilization of language, the commonality of use of language, language as it were outside the individual. Wittgenstein, as we have seen, rejected any notion of a private language. This is in complete contradistinction to Sartre. Iris Murdock points out that for Sartre language gives voice to the 'self enclosed consciousness' of the individual. Only after this primary duty does language take our the task of linking the individual's thoughts 
with the goings our in the outside world. Language for Wittgenstein is in itself a shared achievement, in fact one of, if not the, greatest shared achievement of mankind. For Sartre the individual is separate from the outside, there is a divide here that is fundamentel to the essence of each case. 
 It is both self evident, and a fundamental of Wittgenstein's thought, that language is to do with externality and traditions and ideas that are held in common. This is in sharp contrast to the solipsism exhibited by Sarte.  Murdoch suggests that, for Sartre language articulates a consciousness that is to all intents and purposes an enclosed entity.  (LJ if that's so, where do the ideas of direction come from?)  When we talk of direction in relation to thinking however, it is clear that true direction can only be moved towards if we have as full access as possible to the richness and diversity of a form of ordinary language (in this sense we refer to ordinary language philosophy).
  What do we mean by true direction? Well, it is self evident that if we were limitied to a sort of Cartesian silopsism we would have significant drawbacks in exploring the many and varied directions that may be available to us. It is difficult to see how a form of private language, (which Sartre seems to believe exists), can be used effectively to connect to an 'outside world' of entities which this sort of language has no effective way of connecting with, at least in any understandable way. If, as Sartre suggests, language is at base the pronouncements of a self enclosed consciousness, then it is indeed in poor shape to link with the immeasurable influences and stimuli that arise outside the self-enclosed consciousness.
 Following Wittgenstein, and from what has been outlined earlier, the contention behind this Note to Cogento follows a use-based theory of meaning in language. Now this theory does not enunciate a model in terms of ‘empirical’, ‘logical’, ‘necessary’, ‘contingent’ or ‘analytic’ or ‘synthetic’ propositions etc considered alone, in and of itself. Put another way the content of a proposition does not determine which of these categories it goes into, it is the way it is used in an active and developing language system that is important, and the part it plays in such development.
 So we can  that language is more than grammar. That is important for us in our consideration of language as an indespensible part of thought direction, for our premis is that language, and life, considt of many elements, and it is a combination of all these elements that gives direction. We can judge how important and powerful language is in our context by saying, and this may seem heresy to some, that grammar is not the structure that gives language its power and effect, but a consequence or a ramification of language in its proper role in the social, cultural, analytic world of the interaction of uman beings functioning in a human society.
 So, following Wittgenstein, and maybe extrapolating a little, we can say that language, by its very nature, is intrisically involved with human action. The components of language, words, sentences paragraphs etc are a part of a larger whole, which itself consists of actions, emotions, vision etc, which of themselves need language, but which are also outside additions to language. It is this intermix which results in the functionalities and capabilities  Language is “. . .the whole, consisting of language and the actions into which it is woven” (Wittgenstein, 1953, p. 7). 
 When a child learns language it learns at the same time what is to be investigated and what not. When it learns that there is a cupboard in the room it isn’t taught to doubt whether what it sees later on is still a cupboard or only a kind of stage set. (Wittgenstein, 1969, p. 472) The child, should like to say, learns to react in such-and-such a way; and in so reacting it doesn’t so far know anything. Knowing only begins at a later level. (Wittgenstein, 1969, p. 538)  
  Support for the Wittgenstein analysis comes from Ryle (The Concept of Mind 1949). This book rejects the Mind Body dualism of Descarte and puts the view that mental processes cannot be separated from physical processes. Ryle states "I hope to prove that it is entirely false, and false not in detail but in principle. It is not merely an assemblage of particular mistakes. It is one big mistake and a mistake of a special kind. It is, namely, a category mistake." Ryle's thesis is that mental processes are in fact intelligent acts themselves. We cannot suggest that theoretical reasoning is in some way a represented by coordinated actions, it is the coordinated actions. There is no ghost which haunts the body and in some way causes or oversees these intelligent and intelligible actions, the reasoning and the acting out of the reasoning are in fact one and the same.
 
According to Ryle, mental processes are merely intelligent acts. There are no mental processes that are distinct from intelligent acts. The operations of the mind are not merely represented by intelligent acts, they are the same as those intelligent acts. Thus, acts of learning, remembering, imagining, knowing, or willing are not merely clues to hidden mental processes or to complex sequences of intellectual operations, they are the way in which those mental processes or intellectual operations are defined. Logical propositions are not merely clues to modes of reasoning, they are those modes of reasoning.  
  One more aspect to consider, an extremely important aspect. Descartes, as we have seen, and in keeping with the knowledge base he had at his disposal, approached these problems from the solypsis angle. Driving out doubt through each stage from a solyptic perspective. Wittgenstein does not approach from this direction. He develops his ideas from the perspective of language, and as he shows the impossibility of a private language, then a public language is what we work with. It is impossible, using Wittgenstein's analysis, for a human being to exist in Descartes sylopsism. The importance of language, for Wittgenstein, is pivotal. It could be asked perhaps whether language is always necessary, say in the world of an animal or a baby brought up devoid of human connections. Wittgenstein wrote “If a lion could speak, we could not understand him”. A lion exists in his own world, a conceptual world which he understands. If he didn't understand it he couldn't exist within it.
 So Descarte, and through him Sartre, envisage a world of sylloptic isolation. Descarte  has, through his doubting of everything, comes to the one thing he can be sure of, thinking. This is an immense intellectual achievement. But we have shown, through our analysis and summary of Wittgenstein, that a private language cannot exist. That language, our tool for thought, our passport to the world, is a complicated social construct. Descarte's doubts about the existence of others therefore falls at this fence. For Descarte reasons in language, and language is a social, a communal construct, which depends upon others for its very legitimacy.
 Saul Kripke's contribution in creating the Kripke Wittgenstein has, in some small but significant way, gone to reinforce the Wittgenstein analysis. And indeed we can include Chomsky's critique in this too. Robinson Crusoe forms a central point in the Kripke Chomsky argument. Kripke's Wittgenstein suggests Crusoe is attributed rule following, and this in turn makes him a person in the conventional sense. But wait, Wittgenstein would say that Chomsky et al have not fully taken on the Wittgenstein analysis. The attribution of rule following could not be done by Crusoe, for he has no criteria to do this. No, the attribution of rule following is a job for society, for the rule governed community to decide upon. We may decide to cede this to Crusoe, but that would be the rule a following community decision. As Kripke points out, our ascription of the title of person to Crusoe means that we take im in to our rule governed community. All of this makes sense in the social interaction of the Wittgenstein model, and the custom and practise that emanate from such social interactions.
  Now one of these social and communal constructs that those in society possess is that of direction (of thought). Indeed without such a construct it is difficult to imagine a functioning person, let alone a functioning society. Hence we return to our central theme, that an indespensible condition of thinking is direction, and that without direction thinking in the conventional sense is not possible.
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